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Privatization and Liberalization in Vertically Linked Markets 
ABSTRACT 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are often vertically integrated firms which operate in 
key industries like transport, telecommunication and power generation. They provide an 
infrastructure and invest in its quality. We discuss the effects of liberalization and their 
privatization which can be complete or partial such that upstream production is still run 
by an SOE. We show that granting a downstream rival access to the infrastructure of a 
vertically integrated private firm is welfare improving in most cases even if a holdup 
problem exists. For any vertically separated structure we find that privatization through 
multi-product firms welfare dominates privatization through single-product firms. JEL-
Classification: L33, L23, H54. 
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Privatization and Liberalization in Vertically Linked Markets 
1 INTRODUCTION 
After World War II, a lot of democratic countries had a large public sector which con-
trolled key industries (Zürn and Leibfried, 2005). The worldwide recessions of 1974 and 
1980/81, however, made economic policy reconsider whether services of general inter-
est1 (e.g. gas and water supply, power generation and transmission, air and rail transport, 
telecommunications) and other key industries (e.g. mining and steal production) should 
be provided publicly by state owned enterprises (SOEs).2 Although not being the first 
privatization, the initial public offering of British Telecom by the Thatcher government 
in 1984 was a start for a wave of privatization initiatives that filled public cash boxes 
with more than 1 billion US dollars in the 1990s (for a survey including a historical 
overview of privatization activities see Megginson and Netter, 2001). 
Prior to privatization, even many economists shared the postwar view that general in-
terest services should be provided publicly. A lot of these services have the character of 
providing an infrastructure which is necessary to offer other services. An infrastructure 
requires substantial fixed costs and thus implies increasing returns to scale, potentially 
creating a natural monopoly. Furthermore, the quality of the infrastructure can be cru-
cial for the quality of services which can be provided by using it. An important objec-
tive of privatization has been an increase in economic efficiency,3 which is guaranteed 
only if privatizing natural monopolies and the resulting need to establish regulatory au-
thorities outperform the business model of an SOE. Laffont and Tirole (1993) empha-
sized that this is basically an empirical question. Newberry (1997) highlighted that there 
is a natural complementarity between liberalization (i.e. introducing competition) and 
privatization (i.e. a change of the ownership structure of a firm). He concludes that in-
troducing competition was the key to achieving the full benefits of privatization and 
privatization was only a necessary but not a sufficient condition. In contrast to this, reg-
ulation was inevitably inefficient. It is obvious that replacing regulation by competition 
                                                 
1  Article 86 (2) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community which was signed on March 25, 1957, explic-
itly mentions "undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest" (emphasis 
added). 
2  According to the World Bank (1995) definition, SOEs are "government-owned or government-controlled eco-
nomic entities that generate the bulk of their revenues from selling goods and services". 
3  Price Waterhouse (1989a, b) listed six main goals of privatization: (i) raise revenue for state, (ii) promote eco-
nomic efficiency, (iii) reduce government interference in the economy, (iv) promote wider share ownership, (v) 
provide opportunity to introduce competition, and (vi) subject SOEs to market discipline. 
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would require a vertical restructuring or separation of formerly SOEs into (regulated) 
network operations and network-bound services. 
Building upon works of Boiteaux (1971) and others regarding the regulation and 
price formation of public monopolies Bos (1987, 1988) developed a formal model of 
privatization. A central assumption is that privatization involves efficiency gains for the 
respective firm. Numerous empirical studies seem to support Bos' presupposition (for a 
survey see Megginson and Netter, 2001). For example, using a panel of internationally 
operating airlines Ehrlich et al. (1994) demonstrated an annual productivity increase of 
1.6 to 2% and a decline of unit costs of up to 1.9% after privatization. Newberry (1997) 
highlighted that productivity changes can either be due to restructuring and privatization 
(as in the case the UK's Central Electricity Generating Board) or due to liberalization (as 
in the case of British Telecom). The effect on consumer welfare was unclear: while 
telecommunication prices sunk, electricity companies raised profits rather than cutting 
prices. 
In this paper, we study the welfare effects of privatizing SOEs that provide general 
interest services and establish a vertical link. This can be explained best by the example 
of railroad transport because "in railways, while the infrastructure of track and stations 
etc. is naturally monopolistic, the supply of train services might not be" (Vickers, 1995, 
p. 1).4 From an industrial organization perspective a public railway enterprise is a verti-
cally integrated firm. The upstream firm erects and maintains an infrastructure in terms 
of track and stations to be used as an input for the downstream firm. The downstream 
firm offers transport services to passengers or freight companies. 
The reform of the railway sector may proceed in several steps. Formal and material 
privatization involve a reorganization of a formerly SOE's legal structure and its sale to 
the public, respectively. Additionally, regulation may still play a crucial role, in particu-
lar when upstream and downstream activities are separated and access rules are deter-
mined. Liberalization may allow for free market entry at the downstream level, and ver-
tical restructuring may separate network operations from services. Obviously, each step 
may have different positive and negative welfare consequences. Privatization rules out 
goals inconsistent with profit maximization (such as redistribution or job preservation) 
and exposes firms to capital market principles (see, e.g., Shleifer, 1998). Hence, produc-
tivity is likely to increase. At the same time, there may be a disadvantageous shifting of 
                                                 
4  For an critical assessments of British rail privatization see Preston (1996) and Gibb et al. (1996). See also Affuso 
and Newberry (2002). Lodge (2003) provides a comparative analysis of British and German railway regulation. 
An overview of privatization activities in the EU and Japan is given in Obermauer (2001). Evidence for emerging 
countries is reported in Estache et al. (2001) [Brazil] and Ramamurti (1997) [Argentine]. The problems associated 
with liberalizing other network sector such as the electricity industry are discussed, e.g., in Newberry (2002). 
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consumer surplus towards the firms which exercise market power. Regulation may con-
strain the monopoly power of the privatized firm, but may itself involve distortions. As 
long as the vertical structure of the industry is still controlled by a single firm, entrants 
may find it hard to get access to the network.5 Separating network operations from ser-
vices disables the upstream firm from discriminatory behavior but involves the well 
known double-marginalization problem (Cournot, 1927; Sonnenschein, 1968). 
It is this setup of vertical relations in which we will consider the tradeoffs between 
privatization and keeping an SOE on different vertical stages. To this end, we use a 
model which is closest to Vickers (1995). Like us, he analyzed whether a natural mo-
nopolist in the upstream market should also be allowed to act in the competitive down-
stream market. However, he applied an imperfect-information-imperfect-competition 
framework and did not allow for economies of scope. Interestingly, he showed that the 
welfare comparison between integration and segregation can be ambiguous, that is, the 
regulation of access prices can make non-integrated downstream firms worse off.6 
Gangopadhyay (2006) challenged the ambiguity result. He re-established the conven-
tional wisdom, that monopoly power of integrated upstream firms may seriously distort 
competition on downstream markets using a model with perfect information. In the sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium of his two-stage game, the integrated monopolist sets a 
prohibitive input price as to drive non-integrated firms' profits to zero. Sadka and 
Negrin (2004) demonstrated that "light-handed" regulation (only the access price is 
fixed by the regulator) of vertically integrated firms can outperform "full" regulation 
(both access price and final outputs are determined by the regulator) if the regulator 
faces incomplete information about the entrants' firms costs.7 Iossa and Stroffolini 
(2007) investigated the effects of downstream demand uncertainty and found that verti-
cal integration may perform better if the regulator cannot observe information acquisi-
tion by the upstream monopolist.8 
                                                 
5  Zauner (2004) reported the results of a survey among German train operating companies (TOCs) with regard to 
the vertically integrated railway network supplier Deutsche Bahn Netz. The initial track access charges system 
favored the TOCs of the Deutsche Bahn exhibiting relatively high demand of track kilometers and had to be re-
placed by a neutral track access charge system in 2001. Interestingly, the survey revealed some instances of non-
price discrimination such as disadvantageous allocation of railway slots. 
6  Using a contract-theoretic approach Saavedra (2001) shed further light on the ambiguity of the welfare effects of 
vertical separation. 
7  An interesting extension of this literature is Matsukawa (2005), who studied optimal tariff setting in congestible 
networks. 
8  Calzolari and Scarpa (2008) concluded that regulatory policies depend on whether monopolists operate only 
domestically or also abroad. 
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In this paper, we consider a full-information theoretical framework and focus on the 
role of the infrastructure's quality. The innovation of the paper is that we model the up-
stream firm's decision problem as a quality investment for a given network infrastruc-
ture (quantity). Hence, upstream output enters the representative user's utility function 
as a weight attached to the number of consumed downstream services (train journeys) 
rather than being combined with downstream output in the downstream production 
process. To our knowledge, only Economides (1997) has considered the role of quality 
in an upstream market. However, his model assumes that consumed quality is the mini-
mum of upstream and downstream quality whereas our model assumes that quality is 
determined by upstream production. A further distinctive feature of our model is that we 
allow for economies of scope in the case of vertical integration. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. 
Section 3 computes our two benchmark scenarios, for the vertically integrated monopo-
list and the vertically integrated SOE, and discusses the case of a vertically integrated 
incumbent firm which is potentially challenged by an entrant. Section 4 deals with the 
case of separation and liberalization under different setups in the downstream and the 
upstream market. Section 5 concludes. 
2 THE MODEL 
We assume that there are two services X and Y offered by using an infrastructure as a 
necessary input. The utility of a representative consumer is given by 
 
with α, β > 0, – β ≤ γ <  and z denoting quality of the upstream input, i.e. infrastructure 
quality. Maximization yields the inverse demand functions 
 
This simple setup allows us to distinguish three different cases of demand interaction 
between these two services. Appendix A.1 shows that the sign of a change in demand 
with the price of the other service depends on γ. If  ]0, β[, an increase in price will 
decrease the other service demand and both services are complements. If γ [–β, 0[, an 
increase in price will increase the other service demand and both services are substi-
tutes. Finally, in the special case of γ = 0, both markets are independent. The parameter 
α measures the strength of quality z as perceived by consumers. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 95) 
- 5 - 
As for costs, we normalize the marginal cost of using the infrastructure to zero. As 
usual in the industrial organization literature, we will label the provision of infrastruc-
ture as upstream production. Since we do not endogenize market structures, we will 
ignore any fixed cost in the downstream market. The upstream production cost, Cu, de-
pends on vertical integration. In case of vertical integration, there are economies of 
scope such that 
 
F denotes the fixed cost to run the infrastructure with lowest quality and is assumed to 
be substantial such that the upstream production warrants a natural monopoly. The pa-
rameter δ measures the strength of economies of scope. Note that this is not a usual up-
stream production process as the input produced is infrastructure, and not a number of 
intermediates and the infrastructure's quality affects demand. Hence, an increase in z is 
regarded as an increase in horizontal quality of the service provided by the downstream 
industry. 
If the industry is vertically integrated, quality investment can be more efficient as to 
support better services, e.g. because service and quality improvement are coordinated 
in-house, and this effect is captured by economies of scope. One way of looking upon it 
is that a vertically integrated firm coordinates quality investment with its supply and can 
target its investment to areas where they are most productive. Alternatively, a vertically 
integrated firm may plan downstream services such that they use quality investments 
most efficiently as it knows well how to exploit this investment for operating the ser-
vice. Both effects are not explicitly modelled, but the term δz(X + Y) can be regarded as 
a proxy for the cost reductions which these effects imply. We will assume that this ef-
fect is not too strong as to make the marginal cost of quality negative; hence 
cz - δ(X + Y) > 0. Furthermore, we will assume that economies of scope are also present 
if one firm controls upstream production and is active in the downstream market but 
faces competition in this market. In this case, the vertically integrated firm correctly 
anticipates downstream production of rivals and is able to specify quality investments 
such that they reduce marginal production costs. 
Hence, firms have to be active in the downstream market as well in order to be able 
to realize economies of scope. Otherwise, their business activities are too remote as to 
capture these gains, and thus there are no economies of scope in case of separation. Ac-
cordingly, upstream costs are equal to 
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without integration. In both cases, quality is produced with increasing marginal costs. 
Downstream production costs are linear in the service level and given by 
 
respectively, where  denotes firm-specific output in market X(Y). If upstream 
and/or downstream production is run by an SOE, all costs are higher by a factor (1 + λ). 
All private firms are assumed to be profit maximizing, whereas any SOE aims at maxi-
mizing social welfare. As for welfare, we have to distinguish several cases, but we will 
give both consumers and producers equal weight.9 Welfare is equal to 
 
3 VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
We start with the case of vertical integration. We will consider three different setups. 
The first case is the simplest and deals with a vertically integrated monopolist. The sec-
ond one is the case of the vertically integrated SOE. Finally, we consider a vertically 
integrated duopolist which potentially competes or is forced to compete with a rival in 
the downstream market. 
3.1 Vertically integrated monopolist vs. vertically integrated SOE 
The vertically integrated monopolist maximizes its 
profit *u
Y
d
X
dyx CCCYpXp    over z, X and Y. The first-order conditions are 
 
Appendix A.2 has the details of this computation and shows that the second-order con-
ditions require that c(β – γ) > (α + δ)2. The first-order conditions lead to equilibrium 
outputs and quality of 
                                                 
9  Hence, we do not consider cases in which foreign firms are active and the local government does not take their 
profits into account. For the role of foreign firms competing against local private or public firms see Long and 
Stahler (2009). 
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The vertically integrated monopolist is able to realize economies of scope and has lower 
production costs than its state-owned counterpart. It also exploits its market power in 
both the X and the Y market, internalizing the externality between both. According to 
(2), welfare is equal to 
 
The vertically integrated SOE maximizes welfare (A + αz — (1 + λ)θ)(X + Y) – β(X2/2 + 
Y2/2) + γXY – (1 + λ)(cz2/2 – δz(X + Y)) over z, X and Y. The first-order conditions are 
 
Appendix A.3 has the details of this computation and shows that the second-order con-
ditions require that c(β – γ)(1 + λ) > (α + (1 + λ)δ)2. The first-order conditions lead to 
equilibrium outputs and quality of 
 
Let us compare these results with those for the vertically integrated monopolist. For 
λ = 0, we find that 
 
Not surprisingly, outputs and quality are twice larger if the business is run by an SOE 
without cost disadvantage. In general, the welfare level implied by a vertically inte-
grated SOE is equal to 
 
For λ = 0, we find a welfare level of 
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Comparing (8) with (4) leads to our first result. 
Lemma 1 The vertically integrated SOE welfare dominates (is welfare dominated by) 
the vertically integrated monopolist if λ is small (large). 
Proof: Expression (8) is strictly larger than (4). Appendix A. 3 shows that (7) decreases 
with λ.  
Lemma 1 is not surprising as there is obviously a trade-off between an SOE running 
the whole business inefficiently and efficient firm maximizing profits. Welfare levels 
(4) and (7) will serve as benchmarks for our comparison with other setups. 
3.2 Vertically integrated duopolist 
Having compared the two different business models for a vertically integrated firm, we 
now turn to a setup in which an incumbent, vertically integrated firm is potentially chal-
lenged by a rival firm which operates in the downstream market. This rival firm needs 
access to the incumbent's upstream supply of infrastructure, and if it has access, it will 
also benefit from the infrastructure's quality. We label both firms as duopolists as they 
potentially compete against each other in the downstream market. We assume that the 
vertically integrated duopolist (firm 1) correctly anticipates the output of its rival (firm 
2), if positive, and is thus able to realize the whole economies of scope. Furthermore, 
we assume that vertical relations are regulated such that access to the infrastructure war-
rants firm 2 to pay a user charge q to firm 1 which depends on its services in the down-
stream market. Hence, we do not allow for two-part tariffs but only for linear pricing.10 
This assumption reflects the idea that access should not be discriminatory and should be 
independent of the firm size of a potential rival. 
We start with considering a two-stage game in which the user price q is exogenous, 
and the vertically integrated firm determines quality first before it competes against the 
rival firm in the downstream market. For the moment, we assume that q is not too large 
so that firm 2 will be active in the downstream market. Later on, we will endogenize q 
such that (i) either firm 1 has the right to determine q or (ii) a regulating authority de-
termines q as to maximize social welfare. Appendix A.4 has all the details of this case 
and shows that the outputs for a given q and z are equal to 
                                                 
10  The case of two-part tariffs is trivial under complete information because it enables the upstream firm to appro-
priate any operating profits of its downstream rival. In our setup, however, results would not change. See footnote 
12. 
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Firm 1 correctly anticipates these outputs and maximizes its profits with respect to z for 
a fixed q. Note that firm 1's profits also depend on firm 2's outputs as it receives reve-
nues from the use of its infrastructure. Appendix A.4 shows that the second-order condi-
tions require that c(β – γ) > 4(α2 + 7αδ + δ2). It also shows that the optimal quality pro-
vided by firm 1 for a fixed q is equal to 
 
How does quality change with the user price q? Eq. (10) proves that the effect depends 
on the size of the quality improvement as perceived by consumers and the size of the 
economies of scope. 
Proposition 1 An increase in the user price q increases (decreases) quality if α > (<)δ. 
Proposition 1 deserves a thorough discussion. Its intuition can be understood best if 
we consider the extreme cases of no economies of scope, that is δ = 0, and the case of 
no effect of infrastructure quality on demand, that is α = 0. Suppose that q declines 
which results in less access revenues for firm 1. If δ = 0, firm 1 will not benefit from 
economies of scope but a substantially high quality level makes its rival strong. Hence, 
if q declines, firm 1 will reduce the quality level as to reduce the positive externality 
created for firm 2 when access revenues go down. If α = 0, there is no positive external-
ity from providing a high quality, and hence quality does not improve firm 2's profits. 
However, there are economies of scope and since the access revenues from firm 2 be-
come less important, firm 1 will increase quality as to reduce its marginal production 
costs in the second stage. It thereby commits itself to be more aggressive in the service 
market, and the increase in profits in the downstream market overcompensates the de-
cline in access revenues.11 Hence, quality goes up in this case. 
Let us now turn to the case in which access is completely controlled by the incum-
bent firm. In this case, a two-stage game is played in which the incumbent determines 
both q and z in the first stage, and both firms compete against each other in the second 
stage. If the incumbent firm does not charge a prohibitively large user price, it will get 
                                                 
11  This is a well known effect from R&D models in which a firm does excessive R&D as to reduce marginal costs 
and to steal profits from its rival in the product market. For the pioneering paper see Spencer and Brander (1983). 
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access revenues from firm 2 for the price of competition in the second stage. The fol-
lowing lemma shows that monopolistic profits are larger. 
Lemma 2 A vertically integrated private firm will always offer a prohibitively large 
user price to a downstream competitor. 
Proof: See Appendix A.4. 
Hence, we cannot expect that a vertically integrated firm will allow access to the in-
frastructure is controls. The reason is that the sum of duopolistic profit in the second 
stage and access revenues is substantially lower than the monopolistic profits for any 
user price which is not prohibitive.12 Given Lemma 2, we now consider a game in which 
the government is able to force the private firm to offer a non-prohibitive user price to a 
downstream competitor. 
Of course, it would be easy if the government could commit itself to a user price de-
pendent on the quality provided by firm 1 - mechanism design with complete informa-
tion is a simple task. However, it seems more realistic that a quality investment will 
precede the determination of a user price, and hence firm 1 faces a holdup problem. 
Even if the government promises a high user price, it will take quality as given and 
maximize social welfare for a given quality level later on, so that it will reconsider and 
revise its policy once the quality level is fixed. This will, of course, be anticipated by 
firm 1. Accordingly, we consider the following three-stage game: in the first stage, firm 
1 will determine the quality level of the infrastructure, in the second stage, the govern-
ment sets the user price for which access has to be granted for firm 2, and in the third 
stage, both firms compete against each other. As for the second stage, we restrict the set 
of feasible user prices such that they should not fall short of the marginal infrastructure 
user cost (which we have normalized to zero). This restriction is reasonable because 
regulation should not allow expropriating firm 1 such that firm 1 has to financially sub-
sidize the access of its rival firm. 
We solve the game by backward induction, and we find for the second stage that the 
lower bound on q is binding. 
Lemma 3 The welfare maximizing user price is equal to the marginal infrastructure 
cost, that is, q = 0. 
                                                 
12  This result may change if downstream marginal costs are not constant, and hence it may be profitable to share the 
market if two firms can produce for substantially lower marginal costs than a single firm. However, firm 1 would 
be better off by employing two production units as to lower marginal costs compared to allowing a rival access to 
its infrastructure. Note also that our result do not change if we allow for two-part tariffs: since firm 1 cannot 
credibly commit not to be active in the downstream market, it could appropriate only the duopolistic profit if it al-
lows access. 
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Proof: See Appendix A.4. 
Note that - due to Proposition 1 - it depends on the relative strength of the quality ef-
fect on demand compared to the economies of scope effect whether the quality level 
will be larger or lower than in the case of a monopoly. This is not in contrast to the gov-
ernment seeking to increase aggregate output in both markets. If quality is increased 
because the economies of scope effect is dominant, aggregate output will increase be-
cause quality is increased as to increase firm 1's market share. If quality is decreased 
because the externality effect is dominant, aggregate output goes up because firm 2 gets 
access to the market and boosts aggregate output. 
In both cases, however, the imposed user price creates a distortion because firm 1, 
correctly anticipating the user price, responds strategically by adjusting its quality in-
vestments. Either it reduces quality as to reduce the externality or it increases quality as 
to reduce its marginal costs and become more aggressive in the downstream market. 
This distortion has to be balanced against the effect of the output expansion by this in-
tervention. We now compare the welfare level induced by the laissez faire monopolist 
as described above with the welfare level implied by intervention. Appendix A.4 shows 
that the welfare level for a user price of zero is equal to 
 
 
Comparing (11) with (4) yields 
Proposition 2 Assume a vertically integrated duopolist who decides on quality before 
the user price is set equal to marginal infrastructure costs. This duopolist creates a lar-
ger social welfare level than a vertically integrated monopolist if δ is sufficiently small. 
Proof: See Appendix A.4 
Proposition 2 says that an intervention unambiguously improves welfare if the 
economies of scope effect is not strong. The reason is that a high δ lets the incumbent 
firm increase quality excessively for substantial costs as to be more competitive in the 
downstream market. This strategic behavior is costly because quality costs increase 
over-proportionately. Furthermore, it will dominate if α is small, and this strategic in-
centive may reduce social welfare. Note that this is just a possibility but the welfare 
comparison depends on further parameters. If δ is relatively small, the incumbent firm 
will reduce quality, but the welfare reducing effect of a lower quality is unambiguously 
overcompensated by the increase in outputs on the downstream market due to entry of 
rival firm 2. 
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4 SEPARATION 
The last section has by and large left vertical integration intact. In this section, we con-
sider a vertically separated structure. In case of separation, we discuss two different 
setups for the upstream market. Either privatization is complete such that the upstream 
firm providing the infrastructure and investing in its quality is private, too. This profit-
maximizing upstream firm, however, is not allowed to employ nonlinear pricing 
schemes but must use linear prices as to guarantee nondiscrimination in the downstream 
market. This will obviously give rise to a double marginalization problem. Alterna-
tively, we consider partial privatization such that an SOE still runs upstream production. 
Note that vertical separation does not allow for economies of scope anymore. Further-
more, SOEs are less efficient than a private firm in the upstream market. 
Given the nature of demand for two services which are complements (substitutes) if 
γ > (<)0, we consider three different outcomes in the (privatized) downstream market. 
First, we consider the case of bilateral monopoly, that is, there is only one firm in the 
downstream market. Second, we consider a downstream multi-product duopoly, that is, 
there are two firms which compete against each other in both the X and the Y market. 
Third, there are also two firms, but they are single-product firms such that one of them 
serves the X market only and the other only the Y market. This case represents region-
alization if the X and the Y market can be regarded as two regional markets. The game is 
played as follows. In the first stage, the upstream firm determines quality z and the user 
price q. In the second stage, downstream firms determine their outputs as to maximize 
downstream profits. As before, SOEs are considered to maximize social welfare. 
Let us first determine the output decisions of downstream firms. The profits of a 
downstream monopolist are given by (px – θ – q)X + (py – θ – q)Y which leads to out-
put levels of 
 
where the superscript M denotes the downstream monopoly. If two multi-product du-
opolists compete on both markets, firm i's profits are given by (px – θ – q)  + (py – θ –
 q)  where  denotes firm-specific outputs and X = , Y = . The 
Nash equilibrium is given by 
 
where the superscript D denotes the multi-product duopoly. Of course, there is an in-
crease in aggregate output for given q and z due to increased competition, but q and z 
have still to be determined. In case of single-product firms, firm X[Y] serves the X[Y] 
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market only and its profits are equal to (px – θ – q)X[(py – θ – q)Y]. The Nash equilib-
rium of two single-product firms competing against each other is given by 
 
where the superscript S denotes the single-product firms. Note that single-product firms 
produce less for given q and z than the downstream monopolist as long as γ > 0. The 
reason is that single-product firms do not take into account the complementarity of their 
production on consumption of the other service if γ > 0. Let us now scrutinize the up-
stream decision. 
We first consider the case of a private firm in the upstream market. A profit maxi-
mizing upstream firm will set q and z such that its profit q(X + Y) – cz2/2 is maximal, 
correctly anticipating the output decisions of downstream firms. The details of the com-
putations are in Appendix A.5. As for quality and outputs we find that the case of two 
multi-product firms implies the most of all. 
Lemma 4 In case of an upstream monopolist, user prices, qualities and outputs are lar-
ger in case of two multi-product firms compared to a downstream monopoly and two 
single-product firms. User prices, qualities and outputs are larger (smaller) for a down-
stream monopoly compared to two single-product firms if γ > (<)0. 
Proof: See Appendix A.5. 
Lemma 4 shows that two multi-product firms perform best, although they also face 
the highest user price. The higher user price is possible because competition between 
the two firms in both markets implies an increase in supply, and part of the revenues 
hereof can be appropriated by the upstream monopolist. However, the user price is not 
that high that it reduces outputs compared to other setups. The downstream monopolist 
does second-best if γ > 0. The reason is that the downstream monopolist internalizes the 
externality (which is positive if γ > 0) between the two markets. In case of a positive 
externality, this effect is stronger than the competition effect between two single-
product firms. Not surprisingly, these results also imply the welfare ranking. 
Lemma 5 Two multi-product firms welfare dominate both two single-product firms and 
the downstream monopoly, and the downstream monopoly welfare dominates (is wel-
fare dominated by) two single-product firms if γ > (<)0. 
Proof: See Appendix A.5. 
How does our ranking compare to the case of a vertically integrated monopolist? The 
vertically integrated monopolist avoids the double marginalization problem and can 
realize economies of scope. The upstream monopolist controls the infrastructure, but 
two downstream firms will imply more competition. The control for the upstream mar-
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ket and the double marginalization problem imply that the vertically integrated monopo-
list does better than any separation involving an upstream monopolist. 
Proposition 3 A vertically integrated monopolist welfare dominates any outcome involv-
ing an upstream monopolist. 
Proof: See Appendix A.5. 
In Appendix A.5, we show that the welfare implied by a vertically integrated mo-
nopolist is larger than the welfare implied by an upstream monopolist dealing with two 
multi-product firms in the downstream market, even if there are no economies of scope. 
The reason is that the double marginalization problem lets the upstream monopolist 
charge a higher user price if two instead of one multi-product firms are in the down-
stream market. This exacerbates the double marginalization problem such that any com-
petition effect cannot make up the welfare losses compared to a vertically integrated 
monopolist. In conclusion, if the business should be run by private firms (for example 
because SOEs are too inefficient), vertical integration welfare dominates any separation 
because competition is not able to heal double marginalization completely. Furthermore, 
using Proposition 2, comparing separation with the vertically integrated duopolist is 
straightforward: 
Corollary 1 A vertically integrated duopolist who decides on quality before the user 
price is set equal to marginal infrastructure costs implies a larger social welfare level 
than any separation including an upstream monopolist if  is sufficiently small. 
Let us now turn to the mixed case in which an SOE runs the infrastructure, but pri-
vate firms are active in the downstream market. If an SOE is in charge of upstream pro-
duction, its cost are equal to (1 + λ)cz2/2 and its revenues amount to q(X + Y). Not sur-
prisingly, an SOE with no binding budget constraint will run a deficit and will subsidize 
downstream producers by charging user prices which fall short of marginal infrastruc-
ture user cost as to correct for monopolistic distortions. Since we have normalized mar-
ginal infrastructure user costs to zero, q will be negative for all cases. The quality in-
vestment and the welfare level do not depend on the mode of competition and are re-
spectively given by 
 
This welfare level is guaranteed by different (negative) user prices as summarized by 
the following lemma. 
Lemma 6 If a welfare maximizing SOE faces no budget constraint, it will subsidize in-
frastructure use such that the welfare level is identical for all modes of competition. The 
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subsidy paid to two multi-product firms is lowest. The subsidy paid to a downstream 
monopoly is lower (higher) than the one paid to two single-product firms if γ > (<)0. 
Proof: See Appendix A.6. 
How does this welfare level compare to the upstream monopolist and to the vertically 
integrated SOE? The upstream SOE does not imply a double marginalization problem, 
so this is definitely an advantage if the cost disadvantage is not too strong. Compared to 
the vertically integrated SOE, there is a trade-off: on the one hand, the vertically inte-
grated SOE realizes economies of scope; on the other hand, the upstream SOE has 
higher cost only for running the infrastructure, but employs more efficient private firms 
on the downstream market. Proposition 4 summarises these comparisons. 
Proposition 4 If λ is sufficiently small, a welfare maximizing SOE facing no budget con-
straint welfare dominates any separation including an upstream monopolist. If λ is suf-
ficiently large (small) and δ is sufficiently small (large), a welfare maximizing SOE fac-
ing no budget constraint welfare dominates (is welfare dominated by) a vertically inte-
grated SOE. 
Proof: See Appendix A.6 
Our welfare comparison concerning the type of liberalization in the downstream 
market and our invariance w.r.t. the welfare levels depends crucially on the assumption 
that taxes which finance subsidies are lump sum. If taxation is distortionary and implies 
an excess burden, levels will change and the welfare invariance result will not survive. 
Given that welfare functions are concave, the welfare ranking can be derived from the 
size of the subsidy without excess burden, that is, the case with the lowest subsidy level 
will welfare dominate. Hence, the following conclusions are straightforward. 
Corollary 2 In case of an excess burden of taxation, two multi-product firms welfare 
dominate a downstream monoply and two single-product firms. The downstream mo-
nopoly welfare dominates (is welfare dominated by) two single-product firms if 
γ > (<)0. 
We have also considered the special but realistic case that an SOE has to break even 
on the variable costs. The difference to the case of an exogenously fixed shadow price 
of public funds is that the shadow price of this constraint is now endogenously deter-
mined. However, the results do not differ qualitatively. Of course, welfare levels differ 
for a budget-constrained SOE compared to the upstream monopolist, but the welfare 
ranking is the same.1313 Furthermore, it also coincides with the welfare ranking if sub-
                                                 
13  The details for this case are available upon request. 
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sidization implies an excess burden. Hence, we have a robust result in terms of welfare 
for the case of separation: 
Proposition 5 If upstream and downstream activities are separated, two multi-product 
firms welfare dominate a downstream monopoly and welfare dominate weakly two sin-
gle-product firms. If γ > (<)0, the downstream monopoly welfare dominates (is welfare 
dominated by) two single-product firms. 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has demonstrated that there is no clear ranking of SOE vs. private firms but 
the ranking depends on the cost disadvantage and the size of the economies of scope. 
However, we could show that regulating a vertical duopolist as to allow access for a 
downstream rival firm is welfare improving if the economies of scope effect is not too 
strong. If production activities are separated, liberalization in the downstream market is 
welfare dominant if multi-product firms are established. It makes a crucial difference 
whether private firms will operate in separate or common markets after liberalization. 
However, we could also demonstrate that liberalization with an upstream monopolist is 
welfare dominated by a vertically integrated monopolist. 
Our paper offers some guidance with respect to the trade-offs to be taken into ac-
count, and hence it does not arrive at a clear conclusion whether or not privatization 
increases social welfare. It is thus not a surprise that empirical studies arrive at different 
conclusions for different industries. We have focused on the quality of an infrastructure 
input when it is important for consumers, and this angle distinguishes our paper from 
the previous literature. It is left to future research to empirically explore the role infra-
structure quality plays in these markets as to eventually come up with policy recom-
mendations by which type of firms these markets can be served best. 
APPENDIX 
A.1 Direct demand functions 
Computing the direct demand functions yields 
 
from which we observe that 
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A.2 Vertically integrated monopolist 
The second derivatives of the profit function of the vertically integrated monopolist im-
ply a Hessian 
 
where the subscript denotes the partial derivative. The determinant of the first principal 
minors have the right sign, i.e. |H1| = –2/β < 0, |H2| = 4(β2 - 2) > 0. However, |H3| = 
|H| = 4(β + )((α + )2 – c(β – γ)) < 0 requires c(β – γ) > (α + δ)2. 
A.3 Vertically integrated SOE 
The second derivatives of social welfare imply a Hessian 
 
The determinant of the first principal minors have the right sign, i.e. | H1| = –β < 0, |H2| 
= (β2 – γ2) > 0. However, |H3| = |H| = 2(α + δ(1 + λ))2 – c(β – γ)(l + λ) < 0 requires  
c(β – γ)(l + λ) > 2(α + δ(1 + λ))2. Furthermore, we find that 
 
where the sign follows from the restriction that economies of scope should not be so 
strong as to imply negative marginal production costs. From 
 
we find that 
 
which proves that outputs and quality decline with λ. 
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A.4 Vertically integrated duopolist 
In case of a non-prohibitive user price q, firm 1 will maximize 
 
over  and , and firm 2 will maximize 
 
over  and . The first-order conditions yield (9) which in turn can be used to com-
pute the profits of firm 1 as a function of z and q whose first and second derivatives 
w.r.t. z are respectively equal to 
 
and 
 
which requires 9c(β – γ) > 4(α2 + 7αδ + δ2). Setting expression (A.3) equal to zero leads 
to (10). If firm 1 decides on q as well, we have another marginal profit w.r.t. q to con-
sider which is equal to 
 
the second derivative of which is equal to 
 
The cross derivative of firm 1's profits w.r.t. q and z is 
 
and we have to ensure that the Hessian, given by the product of (A.4) and (A.4) minus 
the square of expression (A.7) is positive, that is 
 
which requires c(β – γ) > (α + δ)2. Solving for optimal q and z by setting (A.3) and (A.5) 
equal to zero yields 
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Expression (A.8), however, implies that  =  = 0 which proves Lemma 2. The mar-
ginal welfare w.r.t. q for a given z and the outputs level given by (9) is equal to 
 
The second-order conditions are fulfilled because the second derivative is equal to  
–2/(9(β – γ)) and welfare is concave in q for a given z. However, setting (A.9) equal to 
zero yields a negative user price of –(A – φ) – z(α + 2δ) which is not feasible. Hence, the 
regulator will set q equal to zero (the marginal infrastructure user costs) which proves 
Lemma 3. 
Setting q = 0 in (9) yields the output levels of both firms, and welfare is equal to U – 
 where X and Y denote the aggregate outputs which leads to (11). For 
δ = 0, (11) is equal to 
 
and (4) is equal to 
 
The second expression is smaller because (c(3c(β – γ) – 2α2)(A – θ)2)(9c(β – γ)(A – θ)2) 
– (4(c(β – γ) – α2))(8c(A – θ)2) = c2(2a2 + 5c(β – γ))(β – γ)(A – θ)2 > 0 which proves 
Proposition 2. 
A.5 Profit maximizing upstream firm 
In case of a downstream monopolist, the upstream monopolist maximizes 
 
w.r.t. q and z. The Hessian is equal to (2c(β – γ) – α2)/(β – )2 and warrants c(β – γ) – α2 
> 0 as to guarantee concavity. The first order conditions imply a user price, a quality 
investment and aggregate outputs 
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respectively. In case of two multi-product firms, the upstream monopolist maximizes 
 
w.r.t. q and z. The Hessian is equal to 8(3c(β – γ) – 2α2)/(β – γ)2 and warrants 3c(β – γ) 
– 2α2 > 0 as to guarantee concavity. The first order conditions imply a user price, a qual-
ity investment and aggregate outputs 
 
respectively. In case of two single-product firms, the upstream monopolist maximizes 
 
w.r.t. q and z. The Hessian is equal to 4(c(2β – γ) – α2)/(β – γ)2 and warrants c(2β – γ) – 
α2 > 0 as to guarantee concavity. The first order conditions imply a user price, a quality 
investment and aggregate outputs 
 
respectively. Comparing these terms shows that quality, the user price and outputs with 
two multi-product firms are strictly larger than under a monopoly and weakly larger 
than with two single-product firms. They are only weakly larger as this includes the 
case γ = – for which both duopoly setups coincide. Furthermore, quality, the user price 
and outputs are larger (smaller) under a monopoly compared to two single-product firms 
if γ > (<)0. If a social planner could impose user prices and quality levels, the results 
would be 
 
where the superscript F denotes the first best in this institutional setup. Note that the 
first best requires c(β – γ) – 2α2 > 0 for concavity. We will assume that a first best 
would lead to interior solution, and hence we assume that this condition is fulfilled. 
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Output and quality levels in the other three cases allow us to compute the welfare in the 
different setups, respectively: 
 
Not surprisingly, a comparison of welfare levels shows that welfare is highest for the 
case of two multi-product firms, matched only by two single-product firms if γ = – . 
The monopoly setup dominates (is dominated by) the case of two single-product firms if 
γ > (<)0. 
Let us now compare the best case of vertical separation, which is the case of two 
multi-product firms, with the case of a vertically integrated monopolist. The vertically 
integrated monopolist realizes economies of scope which does not happen in the case of 
two multi-product firms. Hence, the lowest welfare level for a vertically integrated mo-
nopolist is given by (4) for δ = 0: 
 
We will do our proof by contradiction. WD is larger than this term only if 
 
is positive. Note that the first derivative of this term with respect to β — γ is equal to 
 
Since an interior solution for the first best in the case of separation requires c(β – γ) > 
α2, this derivative is clearly negative in the relevant range. Furthermore, the term is zero 
for c(β – γ) = α2, proving that any claim that vertical separation may welfare dominate a 
vertically integrated monopolist leads to a contradiction. 
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A.6 Welfare maximizing upstream SOE 
Maximizing welfare subject to the output levels (12), (13) and (14) leads to user prices 
of 
 
respectively. The second-order conditions require c(β – γ)(1 + λ) > 2α2 such that all 
terms are negative, also demonstrating that qD  qS, qD > qM and qM > (<)qS if γ > (<)0. 
The welfare level implied by a fully integrated SOE is at least equal to 
 
which is computed from (7) for δ = 0. This level is lower than the level implied by a 
welfare-maximizing SOE in case of separation (see Lemma 6). However, it increases 
with δ and decreases more with λ than the welfare implied by a welfare-maximizing 
SOE in case of separation. 
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